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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge. 
 
TKR Cable Company ("TKR") brought this action against 
sellers of cable television descramblers, seeking statutory 
damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of 47 
U.S.C. SS 553 and 605. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the District Court determined, among other 
things, that (1) the defendants had conducted 16 sales of 
cable descramblers in violation of SS 553 and 605, and (2) 
through these sales, the defendants had assisted in the 
interception of radio communications and therefore were 
subject to the more severe statutory penalties ofS 605, 
rather than the relatively lenient penalties ofS 553. After an 
evidentiary hearing on damages, the court imposed the 
minimum damages pursuant to S 605 of $10,000 per 
device, for a total of $160,000. The court also awarded 
counsel fees and granted injunctive relief. 
 
The issue on appeal is whether S 605, which prohibits the 
unauthorized interception of radio communications, applies 
to the sale of cable decoding equipment. The defendant 
sellers, Cable City Corporation and its officers Jay Grabert 
and Chris Schad (collectively "Cable City"), argue that S 553 
is the sole statutory remedy for cable piracy of signals sent 
over terrestrial cable lines, and that S 605 applies only 
against offenders who directly intercept satellite or radio 
broadcasts as they pass through open air. 
 
We hold that a cable television descrambler does not 
facilitate the interception of "communications by radio" and 
therefore the statutory damages available underS 605 do 
not apply here. Accordingly, we will vacate the penalties 
imposed and remand the case for further proceedings. 
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I 
 
TKR, based in Piscataway, New Jersey, provides cable 
television services under the authority of various municipal 
franchises it has purchased. These franchises authorize 
TKR to construct, operate, and maintain cable television 
systems in parts of Middlesex, Monmouth, and Somerset 
counties. TKR offers its subscribers programming in 
packages, which include Basic and Standard services, as 
well as the option to elect premium programming services, 
such as Cinemax, Home Box Office ("HBO"), and Showtime, 
each at an additional monthly charge. TKR also offers Pay- 
Per-View programming, providing subscribers the 
opportunity to purchase individual movies, sporting events, 
or other entertainment at a per event fee. TKR transmits 
the signals for all of its cable television services from its 
reception facilities in Piscataway to the homes of 
subscribers through a network of cable wiring and 
equipment. To prevent subscribers from receiving services 
they have not purchased, TKR encodes the signals, 
providing paying subscribers with a decoder that deciphers 
transmissions for the appropriate channels. Scrambling 
constitutes the primary means by which TKR, as well as 
most cable service providers, prevent theft of their 
transmissions. 
 
In spite of TKR's precautions, the cable theft business 
persists. Cable pirates have permeated the marketplace 
with unauthorized decoders that render viewable previously 
scrambled transmissions. In most cases, TKR cannot detect 
or prevent the theft of its programming services without 
permission from a subscriber to inspect his or her home. 
 
Cable City conducted a cable piracy operation out of an 
office in Matawan, New Jersey. Specifically, Cable City sold 
cable television decoders to the public, offering 
descrambling services to the region for a profit. Cable City 
represented to customers that its descramblers were"bullet 
protected" or "bullet proof," meaning that they could 
circumvent TKR's electronic security measures designed to 
disable pirate decoders. Cable City advertised and marketed 
its illicit wares to TKR's subscribers via "Val-Pak" direct 
mailings, promoting their descramblers as devices designed 
for use on TKR's cable television system. 
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TKR initially noticed Cable City's activities in or around 
April 1996 when some of its employees received these Val- 
Pak mailings. The advertisements stated that Cable City 
sold cable television decoders, remarking in smaller print, 
"Anyone implying theft of cable services will be denied a 
sale." The mailings further stated in yet smaller print, "It Is 
Not The Intent Of Cable City To Defraud Any Pay Television 
Operator And We Will Not Assist Any Company Or 
Individual In Doing The Same." In response to these 
developments, TKR retained a private investigator who 
visited Cable City's office and later purchased a 
descrambler based upon the representation of a Cable City 
sales agent that the device would "get" all of the premium 
and Pay-Per-View channels. During testing at TKR's facility, 
the descrambler received and permitted viewing of all of 
TKR's scrambled programming services, including premium 
and Pay-Per-View programming. 
 
On June 14, 1996, TKR sought and obtained an ex parte 
temporary restraining order from the District Court, 
enjoining Cable City from further sales of cable television 
descramblers. The order further froze the defendants' 
business and personal assets and granted expedited 
discovery. The order additionally authorized the seizure of 
cable television descramblers, business records, and the 
proceeds of descrambler sales. 
 
After a hearing on June 27, 1996, the court issued an 
order entering a preliminary injunction: (1) enjoining the 
continued sale or marketing of decoders; (2) enjoining the 
alteration, removal, or destruction of any business records 
concerning transactions involving decoders; (3) enjoining 
the transfer, withdrawal, or encumbrance of any assets 
without a showing that such action would be necessary for 
personal expenses or legitimate business expenses; (4) 
reaffirming the prior grant of expedited discovery; and (5) 
imposing upon the defendants a duty to notify TKR of their 
subsequent obtainment of any of the above items (i.e., cable 
decoders, business records, illicit proceeds) and to retain 
such items pending a further order of the court. See TKR 
Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., No. 96-2877(GEB), 1996 WL 
465508, at *12 (D.N.J. July 29, 1996). 
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Following discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. On January 27, 1998, the District 
Court granted TKR's motion for summary judgment as to 
all but one defendant, holding Cable City liable under both 
47 U.S.C. SS 553 and 605. The District Court also entered 
a permanent injunction prohibiting Cable City "from selling 
or otherwise distributing any equipment intended for 
unauthorized reception of any communication service 
offered over [TKR's] cable system." TKR Cable Co. v. Cable 
City Corp., No. 96-2877(GEB), slip op. at 11, 13 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 27, 1998); see also 47 U.S.C. S 553 (1991 & Supp. 
2001); 47 U.S.C. S 605 (1991 & Supp. 2001). The court 
denied Cable City's cross-motion for summary judgment. 
Id. The District Court determined that S 605(a) applies to 
Cable City's conduct, stating that "the prohibition 
contained in section 605(a) against the unauthorized 
interception of `radio communications' has also been 
interpreted to include cable television transmissions." Id. at 
4 (quoting TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., 1996 WL 
465508, at *6). Following a subsequent hearing on 
damages, the District Court issued a memorandum 
opinion, finding that Cable City had made 16 decoder sales. 
See TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., No. 96-2877(GEB), 
slip op. at 5-6 (D.N.J. June 11, 1998). In accordance with 
S 605, the court assessed statutory damages of $10,000 per 
violation, amounting to a total damage award of $160,000, 
plus attorneys' fees and costs of $96,514.33. Id .; see also 
TKR Cable Co. v. Cable City Corp., No. 96-2877(GEB), slip 
op. at 2 (D.N.J. Jan. 25, 1999). Cable City filed this appeal. 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. S 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291. With respect to the District Court's decision to 
enter a temporary restraining order and a preliminary 
injunction freezing the defendants' assets, we review the 
District Court's legal conclusions de novo, its factual 
findings for clear error, and its ultimate decision to grant 
injunctive relief for an abuse of discretion. Maldonado v. 
Houstoun, 157 F.3d 179, 183 (3d Cir. 1998). Regarding the 
District Court's decision to grant summary judgment to 
TKR, our review is plenary. Pennsylvania Ass'n of Edwards 
Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 841 (3rd Cir. 2000). 
Summary judgment is appropriate where the record, viewed 
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in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, shows 
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter 
of law. Stanziale v. Jargowsky, 200 F.3d 101, 105 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 
(1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249- 
50 (1986)). 
 
II 
 
Cable City's principal argument is that the District Court 
erred in subjecting it to the exacting liability provisions of 
S 605, rather than assessing liability under the milder 
provisions of S 553.1 Section 605 subjects Cable City to a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Section 605 provides in relevant part: 
 
(a) . . . No person not being authorized by the sender shall intercept 
any radio communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, 
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted 
communication to any person. No person not being entitled thereto shall 
receive or assist in receiving any interstate or foreign communication by 
radio and use such communication (or any information therein 
contained) for his own benefit or for the benefit of another not entitled 
thereto. . . . 
 
(e)(3)(C)(i)(II) [T]he party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory 
damages . . . for each violation of paragraph (4) of this subsection 
involved in the action an aggrieved party may recover statutory damages 
in a sum not less than $10,000, or more than $100,000, as the court 
considers just. 
 
(e)(4) Any person who manufactures, assembles, modifies, imports, 
exports, sells, or distributes any electronic, mechanical, or other device 
or equipment, knowing or having reason to know that the device or 
equipment is primarily of assistance in the unauthorized decryption of 
satellite cable programming, or direct-to-home satellite services, or is 
intended for any other activity prohibited by subsection (a) of this 
section, shall be fined not more than $500,000 for each violation, or 
imprisoned for not more than 5 years for each violation, or both. . . . 
 
Section 553 provides in relevant part: 
 
(a)(1) No person shall intercept or receive or assist in intercepting or 
receiving any communications service offered over a cable system, unless 
specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise 
be specifically authorized by law. 
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minimum liability of $10,000 in damages for each of its 
sixteen decoder box sales, amounting to damages of no less 
than $160,000. Section 553, by contrast, provides a 
statutory damages range of $250 to $10,000 and increases 
the range by an additional $50,000 for violations committed 
"willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or 
private financial gain." Cable City maintains that Congress 
provided liability in S 605 for cable pirates who directly 
intercept airborne transmissions but not for offenders like 
Cable City who sell decoder boxes that intercept cable 
transmissions. TKR contends that S 605 applies because 
Cable City's actions constitute interception or unauthorized 
reception of radio communications. We agree with Cable 
City. 
 
A 
 
We begin by recounting the historical background 
underlying S 605. Although S 605 originally addressed wire 
communications, such as those with which Cable City 
interfered, Congress subsequently revised the section in 
1968, confining its scope nearly exclusively to radio 
transmissions. This statutory alteration proves critical to 
our analysis. 
 
Section 605 has its genesis in the beginning of the 
twentieth century with the enactment, in 1912, of the "Act 
to Regulate Radio Communication." Act of Aug. 13, 1912, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
(2) For the purpose of this section, the term "assist in intercepting or 
receiving" shall include the manufacture or distribution of equipment 
intended by the manufacturer or distributor (as the case may be) for 
unauthorized reception of any communications service offered over a 
cable system in violation of subparagraph (1). 
 
(c)(3)(A)(ii) [T]he party aggrieved may recover an award of statutory 
damages for all violations involved in this action, in a sum of not less 
than $250 or more than $10,000 as the court considers just. 
 
(B) In any case in which the court finds that the violation was 
committed willfully and for purposes of commercial advantage or private 
financial gain, the court in its discretion may increase the award of 
damages . . . by an amount of not more than $50,000. 
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ch. 287, 37 Stat. 302. This act, originally intended to 
protect the confidentiality of wireless ship-to-shore 
communications, defined "radio communications" as "any 
system of electrical communication by telegraphy or 
telephony without the aid of any wire connecting the points 
from and at which the . . . signals . . . are sent or received." 
Id. S 6, 37 Stat. at 308 (emphasis added). Congress 
replaced the 1912 Act with the Radio Act of 1927. Radio 
Act of 1927, ch. 169, 44 Stat. 1162. This measure included 
a definition of radio communication as being "any. . . 
communication of any nature transferred by electrical 
energy from one point to another without the aid of any 
wire connecting the points from and at which the electrical 
energy is sent or received . . . ." Id.S 31, 44 Stat. at 1173 
(emphasis added). These definitions clearly show Congress' 
desire, from the beginning of the twentieth century, to 
distinguish between radio communications and 
communications transmitted over wire. 
 
Seven years later, Congress repealed the Radio Act of 
1927 when it passed the Communications Act of 1934 (the 
"Communications Act" or the "1934 Act"), now codified in 
relevant part at 47 U.S.C. S 605(a). Communications Act of 
1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064. This act established the 
Federal Communications Commission and granted it 
jurisdiction over the regulation of radio and wire 
transmissions. Id. The Communications Act originally 
provided for the maintenance of privacy through four 
clauses that prohibited: (1) the unauthorized divulgence or 
publishing of wire or radio communications by the 
operators responsible for receiving such communication; (2) 
the unauthorized interception and divulgence of wire or 
radio communications; (3) the unauthorized receipt and use 
of wire or radio communications for the benefit of the 
unauthorized receiver or someone else not entitled to the 
communication; and (4) the divulgence, publication, or use 
of unlawfully intercepted information by anyone knowing 
that the information was wrongfully obtained. See id. at 
1103-04 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. S 605(a)). The 
1934 Act further provided definitions of wire and radio 
communication that are still in use today and are codified 
at 47 U.S.C. S 153. Specifically, S 153 defines radio and 
wire communication as follows: 
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       (33) The term radio communication or 
       "communication by radio" means the transmission by 
       radio of writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of 
       all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, 
       apparatus, and services (among other things, the 
       receipt, forwarding, and delivery of communications) 
       incidental to such transmission. . . . 
 
       (52) The term "wire communication" or 
       "communication by wire" means the transmission of 
       writing, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds 
       by aid of wire, cable, or other like connection between 
       the points of origin and reception of such transmission, 
       including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, 
       and services (among other things, the receipt, 
       forwarding, and delivery of communications) incidental 
       to such transmission. 
 
47 U.S.C. S 153(33), (52) (2001). Accordingly, in both the 
principal provisions of the Communications Act, now 
codified at 47 U.S.C. S 605, and the definitional provisions 
now codified at S 153(52) and S 153(33), Congress clearly 
defined wire and radio communications as concepts 
involving distinct types of transmissions. 
 
Thirty-four years after passage of the Communications 
Act, Congress restructured the regulatory framework 
governing the interception of radio and wire 
communications when it passed the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. See Pub. L. No. 90- 
351, 82 Stat. 197 (the "Crime Control Act" or the "1968 
Act"). Seeking to combat a contemporary surge in crime, 
particularly in organized activity, Congress greatly 
expanded the authority of law enforcement officials to 
monitor the communications of suspected offenders. To 
ensure autonomy and coherence in the novel framework of 
the 1968 Act, Congress amended S 605 from the 
Communications Act to remove references to wire 
communications from all but the first clause ofS 605(a), 
which banned the divulgence of wire and radio 
transmissions by communications personnel. See  1968 Act, 
82 Stat. at 223. The legislative history of the 1968 Act 
states that, while the act removed prohibitions on 
interference with, and monitoring of, wire communication 
 
                                9 
  
from the purview of section 605 of the Communications 
Act, Congress introduced comprehensive provisions 
regulating the interception of wire and oral 
communications, now codified at 18 U.S.C. S 2510 et seq. 
See S. Rep. No. 1097 (1968), reprinted in  1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2112, 2196-97. Congress also explained why it removed the 
reference to wire communication in S 605: 
 
       This section amends section 605 of the 
       Communications Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1103, 47 U.S.C. 
       sec. 605 (1958)). This section is not intended merely to 
       be a reenactment of section 605. The new provision is 
       intended as a substitute. The regulation of the 
       interception of wire or oral communications in the future 
       is to be governed by proposed new chapter 119 of title 
       18, United States Code. 
 
Id. (emphasis added) Thus, through the Crime Control Act, 
Congress removed from S 605 of the Communications Act 
the principal share of its authority over wire 
communications, leaving S 605 primarily with radio 
communications. In short, although S 605, as originally 
drafted in 1934, would have reached the cable decoder box 
piracy perpetrated by Cable City, the 1968 Act removed the 
critical language granting S 605 authority over such conduct.2 
 
TKR contends nonetheless that, in spite of the Crime 
Control Act, S 605 continues to cover cable transmissions. 
TKR asserts that, although the 1968 Act removed key 
references to "wire communications" from S 605, the 
remaining references to "radio communication" in the Act 
suffice to encompass the acts of Cable City in the instant 
case. In particular, TKR argues that the definition of 
"[r]adio communication" in S 153(33) supports a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. It is undisputed that the Crime Control Act itself does not cover Cable 
City's actions. Congress, in 18 U.S.C. S 2510(1), restricted the scope of 
wire communications to those aural communications transmitted via 
wire or cable operated by a common carrier. Because, in 1968, the 
Supreme Court determined that cable television distributors do not 
qualify as common carriers, 18 U.S.C. S 2510(1) does not reach cable 
television transmissions. See United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 
392 U.S. 157, 169 n.29 (1968). The 1968 Act therefore does not address 
the defendants' conduct. 
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determination that all wire communications, be they of 
wire, radio, or satellite origin, fall under S 605. TKR notes 
that the provision defining "[r]adio communication" in 
S 153(33) includes within its scope "the transmission by 
radio of [communication] of all kinds, including all 
instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus and services (among 
other things, the receipt, forwarding, and delivery of 
communications) incidental to such transmission." 47 
U.S.C. S 153(33). TKR thereby suggests that all wire 
retransmissions after the receipt of a radio transmission 
necessarily fall within the definition of S 153(33) because 
they entail the conveyance of a radio signal via 
"instrumentalities [or] facilities . . . incidental to such 
communication." Id. 
 
We reject TKR's interpretation of S 153(33) because, as 
the Seventh Circuit noted in United States v. Norris, "if the 
. . . argument is taken to its full conclusion, it .. . 
unacceptably blurs the line between radio and wire 
communications." United States v. Norris, 88 F.3d 462, 467 
(7th Cir. 1996). We believe that such an expansive 
construction of "radio communication" would place an 
unacceptably broad range of transmissions within the 
purview of S 605, effectively ignoring the significance of 
Congress' excision of "wire communication" from S 605. As 
the Norris court noted, this reading of"radio 
communication" would place cordless telephone 
conversations within the ambit of S 605 because they 
commence with a brief radio communication, followed by 
an extensive wire transmission. Moreover, TKR's reading of 
S 153(33) demands undue contortion of the phrase 
"instrumentalities [or] facilities . . . incidental to such 
transmission." Suggesting that an entire cable 
infrastructure constitutes a mere instrumentality incidental 
to the transmission of a satellite broadcast ignores the scale 
of effort entailed in delivering this transmission to a given 
residence. The wires that connect a home satellite dish to 
the living room television arguably constitute facilities 
incidental to the transmission. However, the entire cable 
transmission infrastructure of a city or suburban area, a 
structure that provides a foundation for a significant 
business, such as that of TKR, or any other major cable 
service provider, cannot be considered a mere 
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instrumentality to transmission. The plain language of 
S 153(33), read in the context of the Crime Control Act, 
therefore precludes an interpretation of "radio 
communication" in S 153(33) that would include terrestrial 
cable transmissions such as those in the instant case. 
 
In sum, by transferring authority over wire 
communications to the province of the Crime Control Act, 
Congress removed coverage of wire communications from 
S 605, and thereby excluded activities such as Cable City's 
from that provision's scope. Moreover, contrary to TKR's 
argument, because TKR's cable transmissions are not 
"incidental" to the transmission of radio communications, 
the S 153(33) definition of radio communications that 
accompanies S 605 does not apply here. We believe, 
therefore, that S 605 does not reach Cable City's conduct. 
 
B 
 
Even if there were any doubt as to the facial applicability 
of S 605, the history of both SS 605 and 553 and Congress' 
express intent demonstrates that only S 553, and not S 605, 
applies to Cable City's conduct. Two principal reasons, both 
particularly informed by a historical perspective, 
demonstrate why only S 553, rather than S 605, reaches 
Cable City's conduct: (1) in 1984, Congress enactedS 553 
to combat the novel phenomenon of cable piracy, a crime 
that acquired significance only with the recent expansion of 
the cable industry in the 1970s; and (2) an interpretation of 
S 605 that reaches Cable City's conduct would effectively 
render S 553 superfluous because it would deprive S 553 of 
any substantial activity that it could uniquely address. 
 
We begin by setting S 553 within the context of cable 
industry history. In the years following the passage of the 
1968 Omnibus Crime Control Act, the cable television 
industry witnessed a period of widespread and 
unprecedented expansion. Although cable television, which 
found "its beginnings as a means of providing the residents 
of rural areas with better reception of over-the-air television 
broadcast signals," spread from its inception quickly 
beyond its non-commercial roots in 1949 Oregon, it had 
still, by the mid-1970s, reached "no more than 12 to 15 
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percent of American homes." H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 20- 
21 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, at 4657-58. 
The year 1975, however, brought significant change, 
particularly through the introduction of satellite technology, 
which Congress, in its legislative history to 47 U.S.C. S 553, 
later documented: 
 
       The cable industry has changed dramatically since its 
       beginnings . . . . 
 
       In 1975, Home Box Office (HBO), a Time, Inc. 
       subsidiary, revolutionized the cable industry by 
       launching the satellite delivery of its programming 
       service. This development made it possible to 
       economically deliver to local cable systems by satellite 
       a vast array of national programming services. These 
       new services provided movies, sports, news, and 
       specialized programming directed to a number of 
       individual segments of the national audience such as 
       children, minorities and senior citizens. With the 
       availability of these new services, the cable television 
       industry experienced a new round of growth and 
       expansion, moving into still larger cities with systems 
       that promised over 100 channels to every home. 
 
Id. Addressing this sudden growth of the cable industry 
and its accompanying consequences, Congress in 1984 
promulgated the Cable Communications Policy Act, a new 
regulatory framework for the field of cable television. See 
Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98- 
549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in relevant part at 47 U.S.C. 
S 553) ("Cable Act" or "1984 Act"). 
 
As part of the 1984 Act, Congress passed what is now 47 
U.S.C. S 553(a), which provides, among other things: 
 
       (1) No person shall intercept or receive or assist in 
       intercepting or receiving any communications 
       service offered over a cable system, unless 
       specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator 
       or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by 
       law. 
 
       (2) For purposes of this section, the term "assist in 
       intercepting or receiving" shall include the 
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       manufacture or distribution of equipment intended 
       by the manufacturer or distributor (as the case 
       may be) for unauthorized reception of any 
       communications service offered over a cable 
       system in violation of subparagraph (1). 
 
47 U.S.C. S 553(a). Through these provisions of the Cable 
Act, Congress acknowledged the novel expansion of the 
cable television industry, and created strict new penalties 
to deter cable pirates who would otherwise exploit this 
phenomenon. 
 
As we noted above, Congress enacted S 553 specifically to 
combat the novel phenomenon of cable piracy, a crime that 
emerged in abundance only with the cable industry 
developments of the 1970s. The legislative history to the 
Cable Act supports this interpretation. Congress therein 
expressly identified the threat to the rapidly changing cable 
industry that the newly enacted S 553 would address: 
 
       The Committee is extremely concerned with a 
       problem which is increasingly plaguing the cable 
       industry--the theft of cable service. This problem has 
       taken on many forms from the manufacture and sale of 
       equipment intended to permit reception of cable 
       services without paying for it, to apartment building 
       dwellers "tapping" into cable system wire in a building's 
       hallway that is used for providing service to a 
       neighbor's apartment unit, to the sale by building 
       superintendents of cable converters left behind by 
       previous tenants to new tenants. Such practices not 
       only often permit one to obtain cable service without 
       paying the installation and hook-up costs, but also, for 
       instance, involve individuals gaining access to premium 
       movie and sports channels without paying for the 
       receipt of those services. 
 
       Theft of service is depriving the cable industry of 
       millions of dollars of revenue each year which it should 
       otherwise be receiving. The Committee believes that 
       theft of cable service poses a major threat to the 
       economic viability of cable operators and cable 
       programmers, and creates unfair burdens on cable 
       subscribers who are forced to subsidize the benefits 
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       that other individuals are getting by receiving cable 
       service without paying for it. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4720. It is clear, from the language of the statement 
above, that Congress sought primarily to address the 
phenomena associated with the recent accelerated growth 
of the cable industry, fueled by the "satellite delivery of . . . 
programming service." Id. at 4658. Without this 
"development [which] made it possible to economically 
deliver to local cable systems by satellite a vast array of 
national programming services," there would have been 
neither a greatly expanded cable industry, the greatly 
expanded cable piracy that accompanied it, nor the 
necessity to pass legislation regulating either the former or 
the latter. Id. These concerns all strongly suggest that, in 
enacting S 553 as part of the Cable Communications Policy 
Act, Congress wished to address cable piracy in the most 
thriving and vital sector of the industry. That is, Congress 
intended to regulate the sector wherein cable networks 
"economically deliver to local cable systems by satellite a 
vast array of national programming services"-- the sector 
that had driven the unprecedented growth of the prior 
decade. Id. 
 
TKR argues, however, that S 605 already addressed this 
growing field of cable piracy. We reject TKR's interpretation, 
not only because the legislative history accompanying S 553 
demonstrates that Congress drafted the provision to deter 
the newly emergent and previously unaddressed cable 
piracy, but also because TKR's reading of S 605 would 
effectively render S 553 superfluous. 
 
To avoid suggesting that S 553 is redundant, TKR 
contends that Congress actually drafted S 553 to provide 
liability for interception of communications directed from a 
point of origin to a particular destination solely by wire 
transmissions, a form of transmission that S 605 
undisputedly has not addressed since the passage of the 
1968 Act. Both history and the plain language of the 
statutes, however, expose the flaws in this conception of 
the regulatory framework. By suggesting that Congress 
drafted S 553 because it was primarily concerned with 
purely wire-bound cable transmissions, TKR proposes that 
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Congress conceived S 553 to address only local cable 
programming, a relatively minor segment of the industry. 
This argument ignores Congress' acknowledgment, 
recounted above, that the satellite technology and market 
forces reshaping the cable industry motivated its passage of 
the Cable Act. See, H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 19, reprinted 
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4656 (explaining that new 
legislation was necessary since "[t]he Communications Act 
of 1934 . . . was enacted well before the advent of cable 
television"). 
 
The legislative history to S 553 shows that Congress 
specifically designed the provision to combat decoder box 
piracy of satellite-delivered cable services. In describing the 
ills of decoder boxes, Congress explained that "[s]uch [cable 
piracy] practices not only often permit one to obtain cable 
service without paying the installation and hook-up costs, 
but also, for instance, involve individuals gaining access to 
premium movie and sports channels without paying for the 
receipt of those services." H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 83, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720. This access to 
"premium movie and sports channels" that Congress 
described necessarily entails satellite transmitted 
broadcasts, as such access was a largely novel 
phenomenon that arrived only with the advent of HBO. 
Indeed, Congress specifically ascribed to HBO's delivery "by 
satellite [of] a vast array of national programming services" 
the emergence of "new services [that] provided movies, 
sports, news, and specialized programming directed to a 
number of individual segments of the national audience." 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 21, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4658. In light of the legislative history and the 
substantial changes in the landscape of the cable industry 
that shortly preceded and certainly motivated the passage 
of the Cable Act, it is clear that Congress enactedS 553 
primarily to address the vast array of satellite-initiated 
cable transmissions, rather than the obscure realm of 
ground-initiated transmissions. 
 
Yet, TKR suggests that the latter interpretation ofS 553 
is the one that we should adopt. TKR's reading ofS 553 
must be correct or else its interpretation of S 605 renders 
S 553 unacceptably redundant. TKR maintains that S 605 
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prohibits any interception of a cable television transmission 
where that transmission can claim some satellite origin, 
regardless of whether the interception occurred only after 
the signal had proceeded long past the satellite 
transmission phase and deep into the cable system 
retransmission phase. This broad reading of S 605 would 
encompass all possible interceptions prohibited byS 553, 
except for interceptions of purely wire-bound, ground- 
initiated cable transmissions. To avoid castingS 553 as 
redundant, TKR suggests that Congress enacted S 553 with 
the primary purpose of filling this obscure niche of 
potential cable piracy prohibitions. Because it renders S 553 
superfluous and runs contrary both to history and to 
Congress' express intent, we reject TKR's interpretation. 
 
We believe that Congress clearly enacted S 553 with the 
primary purpose of addressing satellite-initiated cable 
transmissions. Congress created S 553 to address an 
enforcement gap created by the 1968 modification ofS 605, 
which rendered S 605 applicable only to satellite 
transmissions insofar as they are actual airborne 
transmissions. As this gap had been of minimal significance 
until the cable industry expansion, Congress could afford to 
overlook it during much of the interval leading up to the 
1984 Act. By 1984, however, Congress decided that the 
need to deter decoder box piracy of satellite-initiated cable 
television transmissions had become sufficiently pressing to 
merit legislation. In sum, we believe that both the historical 
context of these statutes and the expressed intent of 
Congress support our reading of S 553 as the exclusive 
means of addressing the defendants' conduct. 
 
C 
 
Finally, TKR maintains that we sho uld follow 
International Cablevision, Inc. v. Sykes, 75 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 
1996), in which the Second Circuit read S 605 broadly to 
encompass all satellite-originated transmissions. In 
contrast to the Second Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, in 
Norris, adhered to an analysis resembling more closely the 
one we adopt here, concluding that "cable television 
programming transmitted over a cable network is not a 
`radio communication' as defined in S 153(b), and thus its 
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unlawful interception must be prosecuted under S 553(a) 
and not S 605."3 Norris, 88 F.3d at 469. 
 
In Sykes, the Second Circuit emphasized a section of the 
committee report accompanying S 605, which stated as 
follows: 
 
       Existing section 605 of the Communications Act of 
       1934 includes a prohibition against the unauthorized 
       reception of communications services. Nothing in 
       [S 553] is intended to affect the applicability of existing 
       Section 605 to theft of cable service, or any other 
       remedies available under existing law for theft of 
       service. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4720. In analyzing this passage in the legislative history, 
the Sykes court stated, "Although the issue is not entirely 
free from doubt, the more likely reading of this legislative 
history is that in view of the uniform prior judicial 
interpretation of S 605 as applicable to the theft of cable 
service, the . . . passage in the above quotation was 
intended to make clear that S 605 would continue to be so 
applicable." Sykes, 75 F.3d at 132. 
 
We disagree with the Sykes panel's conclusion because 
we believe it overlooked a key congressional distinction 
concerning the point of unauthorized reception. The 
legislative history nowhere suggests that Congress 
considered S 605 as applying after 1968 to wire 
retransmissions of radio communications. The same 
passage of the committee report in fact demonstrates that, 
when Congress passed the Cable Act, it viewed S 605 as a 
provision applicable only to radio transmissions, and not to 
the subsequent retransmission along cable lines: 
 
       The Committee intends the phrase "service offered over 
       a cable system" to limit the applicability of[S 553] to 
       theft of a service from the point at which it is actually 
       being distributed over a cable system. Thus, situations 
       arising with respect to the reception of services which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In 1996, Congress reorganized S 153. Sections 153(a) and (b) became, 
respectively, SS 153(52) and (33). See  Telecommunications Act of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 61. 
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       are transmitted over-the-air (or through another 
       technology), but which are also distributed over a cable 
       system, continue to be subject to resolution under 
       section 605 to the extent reception or interception 
       occurs prior to or not in connection with, distribution 
       of the service over a cable system. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 98-934 at 83, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
at 4720. This language makes clear Congress' view that 
S 605 is directed solely at radio transmissions "to the extent 
reception or interception occurs prior to or not in 
connection with" cable distribution, and thatS 553 applies 
to theft of all signals being transmitted over a cable system. 
The Sykes court, however, suggests that this passage 
should be interpreted as "establishing S 605's exclusive 
jurisdiction over the transmission of a television signal by 
radio prior to the transmission of that same signal by cable, 
rather than as barring the application of S 605 to the 
subsequent cable transmission of the signal." Sykes, 75 
F.3d at 132. 
 
As the Norris court noted, had Congress truly meant to 
apply S 605 both to airborne and cable transmissions, it 
could have included a sentence stating that 
communications initiated by air transmission, but which 
are subsequently distributed over a cable system, continue 
to be regulated under S 605. See Norris , 88 F.3d at 469. 
Because Congress did not implement such language and 
instead used the "to the extent" phrasing quoted above, the 
legislative history "cannot be reconciled with the conclusion 
that S 605 applies to the unlawful interception of cable 
television programming transmitted over a cable network." 
Id. The committee report therefore substantiates the view 
that S 605 does not render S 553 superfluous because S 605 
does not create liability for the interception of cable system 
transmissions. 
 
The Second Circuit in Sykes nevertheless suggested an 
answer to the redundancy concerns, stating: 
 
       We note that this result does not lead to a complete 
       overlap between the coverage of SS 605 and 553. 
       Section 605 applies to a considerable body of radio 
       transmissions to which S 553 is inapplicable, while 
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       S 553 applies to any transmissions via cable, whether 
       or not they originate as radio transmissions. 
 
Sykes, 75 F.3d at 133. The Sykes court accordingly 
concluded that S 553 avoids a "complete overlap" by 
applying to ground-initiated cable transmissions. As we 
explained, however, a thorough analysis of the 
circumstances surrounding the passage of the Cable Act 
and its legislative history shows that Congress could not 
have enacted S 553 with the primary purpose of filling an 
obscure niche in cable piracy enforcement. Congress' 
language clearly demonstrates that it created S 553 to 
combat significant, novel, and previously unaddressed 
threats to the continued growth of the cable industry. We 
cannot believe that Congress invoked the imagery of a 
criminal activity "increasingly plaguing the cable industry 
. . . that poses a major threat to the economic viability of 
cable operators and cable programmers" only then to enact 
an inconsequential gap filler for an area of law enforcement 
already well fortified. 
 
We therefore conclude that S 605 encompasses the 
interception of satellite transmissions "to the extent 
reception or interception occurs prior to or not in 
connection with, distribution of the service over a cable 
system," and no more. H.R. Rep. No. 98-934, at 83, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4720. Once a satellite 
transmission reaches a cable system's wire distribution 
phase, it is subject to S 553 and is no longer within the 
purview of S 605. Cable City therefore is subject to the 
statutory damages set forth in S 553(c), rather than the 
damages imposed under S 605(e). 
 
III 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the award of 
damages under 47 U.S.C. S 605, and we will remand the 
case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
We will affirm the District Court's imposition of the 
injunction.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. We affirm the decision of the District Court with regard to the 
freezing 
of Cable City's assets. This Court has held that an asset freeze or 
similar 
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injunctive relief is appropriate where it will assist the District Court 
in 
preventing defendants from committing further violations of the 
Communications Act. See General Instrument Corp. of Del. v. Nu-Tek  
Elecs. & Mfg., Inc., 197 F.3d 83 (3d Cir. 1999). We stated in that case 
that defendant's business " `essentially facilitated cable theft in 
violation 
of S 553. To stop such an operation is a primary purpose of the 
injunction. . . . Likewise, . . . [ the defendant ] should not be allowed 
to 
use its remaining assets, which in all likelihood can serve only to 
further 
other cable theft enterprises.' . . . We see no abuse of discretion here. 
. . ." Id. at 90-91 (quoting district court opinion with approval). 
Similarly, 
in this case, we find no abuse of discretion. 
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